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Nonius Software: Venture capital harvesting 
Abstract: This case study discusses the initial opportunity, strategic decisions and financing 
options of Nonius Software, a Portuguese company providing hospitality technology. The case 
is particularly focused on the founders’ available alternatives when venture capital investors, 
that provided growth funding to the company, decide to harvest their investments. António 
Silva, the company CEO, must decide between an IPO, a trade sale, new venture capital or 
private equity investors or a MBO. He evaluates the implications of each option on providing 
an exit to the departing investors, while trying to regain decision power and fund future growth.  
Key words: Financing growth, Venture Capital, Harvesting. 
Introduction  
 António Silva managed to finally sit down at his desk. The last few days had been seriously 
demanding for the founder and CEO of Nonius. In 2015, the Portuguese technological group, 
specialized in the development of digital solutions to the hospitality market, was going through 
a crucial moment in its still short existence.  
 Nonius was founded in 2005, with the purpose of seizing an opportunity created by the fast 
development of wireless technologies and the change in general technological consumption 
behaviors, which led to the emergence of a market for public internet hotspots. Having begun 
by providing a single solution to multiple industries, the company’s product portfolio was 
enlarged over the years, becoming technologically diversified and focused on the hospitality 
market, namely hotels, but also tourist cruise ships and hospitals. Nonius expanded in size and 
clients, starting the internationalization process only two years after its foundation and 
following a policy of growth by acquisitions, resulting in the existing group. 
 After 3 major financing rounds, the company was now facing a new challenge. Apart from 
the founders, Nonius shareholders were mostly venture capitalist funds, and the managers of 
two of them wanted to sell their equity positions. Furthermore, the company needed to keep on 
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pursuing its expansion abroad and funding was needed. Confronted by this scenario, Antonio 
Silva knew that Nonius would have to go either through another financing round or a deep 
capital structure reorganization. He considered the pros and cons of an IPO, a trade sale, the 
entry of new venture capital or private equity and a leveraged management buyout. Being aware 
of the advantages and drawbacks of each option, he was struggling to make a decision, knowing 
that it would impact the entire future of the company. Looking at the ticking clock on the wall 
of his office, he just wished to have more time to make a choice. 
1. Turning the idea into a business 
Back in 2003, António Silva worked as developer of internet access software on a 
multinational company in England. Although being passionate about his job, the Portuguese 
electronics engineer, with a post-graduation on telecommunications and systems networks, had 
the ambition of developing a project of his own. Having a solid experience in software 
development and internet solutions, he wanted to take advantage of his technical insight and 
product market knowledge on communication technologies to conceive an innovative solution. 
He shared his vision with some close connections in the areas of engineering and product 
development and successfully challenged Leonel Domingues and Rui Castro, two former co-
workers and team members in a Portuguese electronics company, to join him. Hence, in mid-
2003, the trio started the conception of a product rooted in innovative features and holding the 
potential of being turned into a business idea. Exhibit 1 outlines the entrepreneurs’ background. 
The plan was to use their expertise in developing management software and 
telecommunications equipment to come up with a forward-looking product that could leverage 
on an unexploited market opportunity. At the time, the technological market was on the verge 
of a significant shift, with wireless internet technologies rapidly emerging as a new trend and 
an increasing number of devices being able to wirelessly connect to the internet and perform 
new functions. To take full advantage of those features, users needed not only reliable wireless 
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internet connections, but also reliable entities that could provide and manage the access to those 
networks, so they could stay connected when away from home (3G and other mobile data 
connections were not yet available for most devices). Given this scenario, the entrepreneurs 
spotted an opportunity in the emergence and widespread of the market for WISPs (Wireless 
Internet Service Providers), i.e. businesses or individuals who provided wireless internet access 
to others, with the possibility of charging for it. Hence, they came up with the idea of developing 
a platform not only to access, but also to manage and monetize internet wireless networks. A 
lot of time and effort was eventually spent in the process of converting this idea into a feasible 
prototype of a marketable product.  
After a year, the three entrepreneurs had created a platform allowing any entity to 
commercialize broadband internet connections. They took advantage of the introduction and 
fast development of the Wi-Fi technology, in view of its high penetration rate in the market and 
low cost. Given the novelty of the market for public hotspots, there were few solutions allowing 
businesses to provide and monetize wireless internet connections and none of them offered as 
many features as the platform developed by the team. 
Since the prototype had achieved a satisfactory development stage, they decided to test its 
business potential in the 1st edition of the contest Concurso de Ideias, promoted by Agência de 
Inovação (AdI) in 2004. The platform was considered one of the 30 best ideas in competition, 
meaning that the project’s viability was approved, a prize of €10k was awarded and validation 
was provided to turn the project into a business.  
2. The birth of Nonius 
In the following months, the entrepreneurs worked hard on every detail of the project. But 
up to that moment, their education and training had been exclusively technical: they had a solid 
background on product development and team management but no experience in building a 
business. To overcome this shortcoming, an extra effort was put on preparing an adequate 
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business plan, and António Silva even took a course on Entrepreneurship and Business 
Management, which proved to be fundamental. 
On the 4th April 2005, the trio founded Nonius Software (Nonius), a company specialized 
in the development and provision of internet accessing and management platforms. First and 
foremost, Nonius intended to be a provider of specific solutions to also specific necessities. The 
strategy was to conceive standard products with broad characteristics and during the later 
development stages redirect the focus to address specific challenges faced by players of a given 
sector. In addition, founders wanted to go beyond the ordinary supplier-customer relationship, 
by partnering up with clients for the development and improvement of solutions, asking for user 
feedback and integrating client suggestions as soon as possible, to quickly address any arising 
issues. Such attention to customer needs and the willingness to customize the product according 
to clients’ requirements soon proved to be a competitive advantage in the market. 
At the time, there were positive growth perspectives for the market of Wi-Fi hotspots. The 
worldwide number of public Wi-Fi hotspots was around 50,000 and it was expected to increase 
to 200,000 by 2008, with the number of users following the same growing trend, from 39 
million to 120 million. In Portugal, the number of public hotspots was expected to increase 15 
times until 2007, representing an increase in the market value from €35m to €550m.  
3. Products and target markets 
In August 2005, the company officially launched its first solution – the WirelessGestServer 
(WGServer) - a platform conceived to provide and manage wireless and cable internet 
connections. In fact, it was already in place at the facilities of some customers, which were 
actively participating on its improvement, according to the differentiation strategy of close 
relationship with clients and quick adjustment to any customization requirement. 
Although Nonius started providing internet access solutions to 4 distinct markets - hotels, 
residential condominiums, business centers and commercial areas - the management quickly 
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realized that the hotel market would be the most successful one. In the words of António Silva, 
“Technology in a hotel conveys a sense of luxury and comfort to guests. … On the one hand, 
the hotel is a business looking for technologically stable solutions, easy to maintain and having 
an affordable cost. On the other hand, guests expect the same, or even better, technology than 
the one they have at home.” 
 Therefore, WGServer features addressed essentially the hospitality industry. Technology 
was becoming increasingly important in that business, with guests demanding more 
technologically updated rooms and hotels searching for customizable solutions that could 
confer them advantage over competitors. The possibility of connecting several devices to the 
internet had become one of the most demanded features, being for many guests one of the first 
factors to consider when choosing a hotel and, consequently, an efficient way to build customer 
loyalty. Hence, hotel units struggled to provide high-quality internet connection services to its 
guests, while effectively managing the access, keeping low installation and maintenance costs 
and profiting from it all. The WGServer was a perfect fit for those needs. 
 The most innovative feature was that it enabled full customization and control over the 
internet offer to guests, making the hotel totally autonomous regarding the internet services 
delivered. The solution also conferred financial benefits to the hotel, both in terms of revenue 
generation, in case management decided to charge guests for the internet service, and in terms 
of cost reduction, by integrating those charges with the accounting system and enabling remote 
maintenance. These features guaranteed a quick return on investment.  
 To clearly differentiate from the competition in the hospitality market, the WGServer 
encompassed a larger set of features. Being developed along with costumers, it could leverage 
on its highly customizable characteristics to match diverse hotel specifications and management 
preferences. In addition, the platform interface was more intuitive and user-friendly than 
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competition, which was crucial to reduce staff training hours in a business with very high staff 
turnover. Exhibit 2 describes the WGServer. 
 The WGServer soon became a reference in the Portuguese market for implementation of 
Wi-Fi hotspots, being installed not only in hotels, but also in residential condominiums, 
companies, cafes, restaurants, business parks and other public spaces. Despite its immediate 
success and positive sales perspectives, Nonius continued investing on R&D, to improve the 
solution and expand the WG product line. As a result, it came up with another two innovative 
platforms: the WGStargate (WGS) and the WGPositionSystem (WG-WPS). Exhibit 3 and 
Exhibit 4 describe those solutions. To develop them, Nonius relied again on partnerships with 
clients, but also on government subsidies, attributed to promote technological innovation in 
startups. The WG product line drove sales during the early years of operation of Nonius.  
 In 2010, a new product was launched, embodying Nonius’ strategic evolution from a 
provider of wireless internet access solutions to several markets to a supplier of last generation 
multimedia technology tailored to the hospitality industry. That product, named NiVo, was a 
multimedia entertainment system for guest rooms, conceived to provide several services to 
guests through the set-top boxes (STB) located in the rooms and connected to the TV. It was 
built on recently updated IP technologies and responded to guests’ expectation of getting 
increasingly interactive experiences from their rooms. Among other features, the system 
allowed to watch television, connect to internet both wirelessly and by cable, get relevant real-
time information such as schedules of airport and nearby transportation and also book available 
amenities like a table at a restaurant or a spa treatment. All this was available just by using the 
TV remote control in the room. Exhibit 5 provides further description of NiVo. 
 Following the launch of NiVo, Nonius decided to rearrange the way its solutions and 
platforms were presented to the market, in order to clarify the product portfolio and show its 
entire focus on the hospitality business. Therefore, 5 product lines were introduced in 2011: 
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Nonius.HSIA, Nonius.TV, Nonius.VoIP, Nonius.Signage and Nonius.Apps. Exhibit 6 
provides the description of those product segments. Nonius also enlarged its interactive TV 
offer by developing apps to run on Smart TVs, in response to the revolution that the market was 
going through. In fact, TV sets were getting its own operating system and supporting 
applications developed exclusively for them, which represented significant savings for hotels, 
since hardware investment could be reduced and apps updated without major expenses. Nonius 
developed its own hospitality applications, which were independent of hardware and could be 
integrated in televisions running on the most common platforms.  
4. Company development 
4.1. First years and internationalization 
 In the first couple of years in operation, Nonius presented a solid commercial and financial 
performance. Following the first sales to the hotel market in the last quarter of 2005, the 
subsequent two years were fundamental for market consolidation of the WirelessGest product 
line, with Nonius becoming a reference in the Portuguese market for implementation of Wi-Fi 
hotspots. The company continuously enlarged its client portfolio, from 10 clients in 2005 to 80 
in 2007, and also the team, which grew to 17 members.  
 In 2007, Nonius put in practice its Development & Expansion (D&E) Plan, a business plan 
designed to increase business volume and initiate internationalization. Considering the 
recognition achieved in the Portuguese market and the current business volume, it was time to 
approach foreign markets and start exporting its solutions. As go-to-market strategy, Nonius 
put up its Value-Added Integrators (VAI) network, comprising accredited telecommunication 
integrators that would resell Nonius’ products and install the technology in clients’ facilities. 
Backed by this network, Nonius could benefit from their presence among clients in target-
markets and leave the burden of setting up its products to specialized companies. As marketing 
strategy, Nonius started attending technology and hospitality fairs to present its solutions, create 
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awareness and brand recognition, forge contacts with market players and find integrators to 
establish partnerships. “Nonius internationalization strategy leverages on finding exclusive 
resellers/distributors for our products in certain countries and geographical areas that the 
company defines as target markets”, mentioned António Silva. 
  The company targeted the Spanish market in a first stage, due to its geographical and 
business proximity, and then expanded to other European and Portuguese-speaking countries. 
However, the company soon faced constraints, being forced to adapt its approach to each 
foreign market due to protectionism and resistance to imported products. In Spain, for instance, 
clients preferred to acquire solutions through local distributors, which led Nonius to build up 
partnerships with integrators and included them on its VAI network. Conversely, the entry in 
Germany had to be done through a licensing process, with the final client buying products as 
they were national technology.  
Nonius’ first international sale happened in 2008, when an integrator from Galicia sold the 
WGServer to a Spanish hotel. Up to 2010, the business volume followed an upward trend and, 
although domestic sales remained the main revenue source, sales from international markets 
increased to almost 20% of revenue. During this period, Nonius was awarded by IAPMEI the 
status of “SME Leader” in 2009, and “SME Excellence” in 2010.  
4.2. Growth through acquisitions 
 In 2011, although Nonius was the market leader of high-speed internet solutions in Portugal 
and a main player in the national market for interactive TV solutions, the company wanted to 
grow even more and become a global player in hospitality technology. A growth plan through 
acquisitions was then put in practice, targeting the Brazilian, African and European markets. 
In the same year, a joint venture with Bluepex, a Brazilian firm specialized in the 
development of technological solutions, gave rise to Tech2H, which became responsible for 
marketing and distributing Nonius solutions in Brazil. Setting up a joint venture with a native 
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company guaranteed quick adaptation to the business reality in the country and soon proved to 
be a successful strategy. In its very first year, Tech2H managed to set up representation deals 
with two large technological integrators in Brazil and became supplier of Accor and 
Transamerica, major hotel chains in South America. The immediate success propelled Nonius 
to invest €44k in the acquisition of an additional 45% of Tech2H in 2012, guaranteeing full 
control of the company. Exhibit 7 presents Tech2H financial performance.  
 In 2012, Nonius also acquired Impresa DGSM, its major competitor in Portugal. Besides 
increasing its market share in Portugal and in African Portuguese-speaking countries, the 
acquisition allowed Nonius to scale up in dimension, becoming a relevant technological 
developer at European level and a more attractive provider to major international hospitality 
groups. Nonius incorporated not only the know-how and specialized human resources of its 
former competitor, but also the interactive TV platform developed by DGSM, enlarging its 
portfolio of solutions. After the acquisition, 19 of the 20th largest Portuguese hotel chains were 
clients of Nonius. Exhibit 8 presents DGSM’s acquisition details and financial performance. 
 In 2014, Nonius presented a solid performance in Brazil, as well as in other Portuguese-
speaking countries, but international business volume seemed to stagnate around 20% of the 
total revenue. An increased presence in European markets was needed and Nonius decided to 
acquire TendiQ, a Dutch technological systems integrator for hospitality markets. The company 
served a portfolio of major international chains as IHG, Marriott and Westcourt and was run by 
a team with large experience and proven merit, having performed integrations in more than 
4,000 hotel rooms across Europe. Exhibit 9 presents TendiQ’s details. 
5. Market and competition 
 In 2014, the hospitality market was going through a period of significant growth and future 
perspectives were also optimistic. In Portugal, the hotel market had a value of €2,204m, with 
1,700 hotels and 16,000 guests, being expected for the following years an annual growth of 
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10% in value, guests and rooms. This was mainly due to the recovery of domestic demand after 
the financial crisis and to the increase of foreign tourists looking to replace more dangerous 
holiday destinations. In Spain, the hotel market was valued in €12,200m, comprising around 
16,800 hotels, with expected increases of near 8% in value and 5% in guests and rooms. Also 
in Brazil, the hotel market increased exponentially, mainly due to the FIFA World Cup, and the 
growing trend was expected to continue, driven by other major sports events hosted by the 
country, such as the 2016 Olympic Games. The expansion of those markets was beneficial for 
hospitality technology providers, since the emergence of new hotel units and the renovation of 
outdated ones implied large investments in technological and digital systems. 
 At the time, Nonius had grown into a corporate group comprised by Nonius Software, 
Nonius Europe (previous TendiQ) and Nonius Brazil (previous Tech2H) and ranked eighth in 
the global hospitality market, serving more than 800 clients and 110,000 rooms in 26 countries. 
In Portugal, Nonius held a 70% share of the market for provision of technological services to 
the hospitality market, having its solutions installed in every major hotel group in the country. 
In Brazil, the company ranked second in the market, serving a total of 260 hotels and being the 
main supplier of digital services to the largest chains. Nonius became a reference as well in the 
market of touristic cruise ships, adding to its client portfolio some major operators. Exhibit 10 
provides information regarding clients and markets served. 
 Since the hotel industry was the most relevant business segment, Nonius financial 
performance improved substantially in the latest years. In 2014, the group’s business volume 
translated into revenues of €4.8m, with international sales generating higher revenues than 
domestic ones. The Iberian market generated almost half of that total revenue. Considering the 
portfolio of products, Nonius.TV represented 60% of sales, followed by Nonius.HSIA with 
29%. To keep up with the continuous growth, the team was successively enlarged, comprising 
almost 60 members in 2014. Exhibit 11 provides Nonius’ financial and operational details. 
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 Regarding competition, Wavecom and Fractalia Hotel Systems were the main players in the 
wireless internet hotspot market, offering platforms that could rival Nonius’ ones. Founded in 
2000, Wavecom was a Portuguese company offering wireless internet solutions similar to the 
WGServer. Its products were present in the hotel market, but they were mainly directed to 
companies and commercial facilities. In turn, Fractalia, a Spanish company founded in 2004, 
specialized in providing internet solutions to the hotel market, but offered no television or other 
services. Its target markets were similar to Nonius, being present mainly in Portugal and Spain. 
Considering only the TV market, the main competitor was HiBox, a Finnish provider of TV 
solutions for the hospitality market founded in 2005. Operating mainly in Europe, its products 
were similar to Nonius.TV, but did not offer wireless internet solutions. In addition, there were 
also some multinational companies, such as Samsung or Huawei, offering similar solutions to 
Nonius, but their products offered no customization to clients and were not adjustable to meet 
specific demands of the sector. In this scenario, Nonius managed to maintain its competitive 
advantage because it offered a bundle of integrated solutions of television, internet, and other 
products, instead of providing an isolated approach to just one product, as those firms. 
6. Financing 
 In the beginning of the project, the three entrepreneurs made an initial investment of €90k 
to fund the development of the prototype into a viable product, which was entirely bootstrapped 
from their own finances. Since it was still a business idea, they preferred to invest their personal 
savings to turn it into an opportunity, instead of taking the risk of raising external funds and 
become liable before any entity.  
 After the prototype reached a reassuring development stage and business viability had been 
provided by the award in the contest, the trio believed it was time to seek external investment. 
Nonius had just been created and funding was needed to get the WGServer ready for 
commercialization and placement in the market. Hence, in July 2005, Nonius went through a 
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start-up financing round. Beta Capital (Beta - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA), a venture 
capital (VC) firm specialized in equity investments on early-stage technology-driven startups, 
invested €51k to acquire 33% of Nonius equity. The founders seek Beta Capital’s investment 
because the VC could be crucial for Nonius growth, playing the role of a mentor and sharing 
fundamental business know-how to lead the company to thrive on the market.  
As any equity investment in a recent venture, Beta Capital attempted to reduce the risks 
associated with its investment, subordinating it to certain terms. The investor was present at 
board meetings and had been granted veto power regarding important subjects, such as 
remuneration, profit distribution, capital injections and issue of preferred and ordinary shares, 
among others. Furthermore, it benefited not only from redemption rights, if its veto on those 
delicate matters was not respected, with founders being obliged to buy back its shares at 4x the 
initial investment, but also from both pre-emption and tag-along rights, in case any founder 
wanted to sell his shares at Nonius. Working as an exit-route covenant, a “drag-along” clause 
was also in force from 2013 onwards, allowing Beta Capital to sell its position to a third party 
and compelling founders to either sell theirs along or redeem its back. To align incentives, it 
has also been established the attribution of performance bonus to the management team, based 
on business volume and profits. Exhibit 12 describes the main terms of Beta’s investment. 
Nonius also benefited from financial support of partners and investors, to bear R&D costs 
and share the risks connected to the development of new solutions, namely the WGS and WG-
WPS. For WGS, the company received a grant within the scope of a startup-directed initiative 
created by the European Space Agency. For WG-WPS, Nonius established a financing 
agreement with Crivo Ventures, receiving €100k in several installments, as the company 
achieved certain progression milestones. In return, Crivo Venture would be entitled to receive 
10% of future revenues generated by sales of WG-WPS, up to the moment when revenue 
amounted to €1.5 million, and 5% onwards. In addition, Nonius also leveraged on several 
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government subsidies, directed to promote innovation and support the internationalization of 
Portuguese ventures and their products. Exhibit 13 shows amounts received in subsidies. 
 In 2007, having the first product already placed in the Portuguese market, Nonius needed 
funding to support its internationalization plan, so management decided to go through a second 
financing round. In June, the Venture Capital Syndication Fund (FSCR) of IAPMEI, the 
Portuguese government agency for promotion of SME, acquired a stake of 13.7% of Nonius 
equity for €205k. The three founders and Beta Capital also invested in this Series A round, with 
Nonius raising a total of €500k to develop new projects, fund the internationalization strategy 
and contribute to the company expansion. Although the FSCR had become shareholder, it could 
not appoint a member to the executive board, comprised by 2 founders and a member of Beta 
Capital. Nevertheless, all the matters previously submitted to Beta Capital’s veto required now 
the approval by holders of 2/3 of the share capital. The FSCR also benefited from redemption, 
pre-emption and tag-along rights as Beta already did, as well as the drag-along clause. In 
addition, as performance bonus, the management team and key employees were entitled to 
receive stock warrants, redeemable at par up to June 2012. Exhibit 14 describes the main terms. 
 To complement funding received from equity investments, Nonius also raised bank debt 
since 2009. The company borrowed funds through medium and long-term loans and bank 
overdrafts, benefiting from low interest rates based on agreements between public entities and 
banks to provide liquidity to SMEs. Borrowed amounts were used to finance the operation, 
providing liquidity and enhancing working capital, rather than potential investments. 
 In 2011, Nonius wanted to consolidate the implementation of its current solutions on the 
national market, to invest substantially on expanding abroad and to increase the life cycle of its 
products. The global strategy was focusing on new markets and growing through acquisitions 
and to fund it the board decided to go through a Series B financing round. In October, Caixa 
Capital, a VC firm owned by the largest Portuguese banking group, acquired 16.67% of Nonius 
15 
 
share capital through its fund EmpreenderMais, investing a total of €1m. The investment 
comprised €120k in share capital and €880k in interest bearing shareholder loans, from which 
€380k were immediately delivered and €500k were subject to the fulfillment of cumulative 
milestones regarding recently launched products and internationalization goals. These 
shareholder loans could also be converted in share capital in the event of a trade sale, an IPO 
or the entry of a new shareholder in a future financing round. In addition, besides the pre-
emption, tag-along and redemption clauses in place from previous rounds and now extensible 
to Caixa Capital, the VC also protected its investment through liquidation and anti-dilution 
clauses and a lock-up period of 3 years for the founders. Moreover, the executive board 
comprised one extra member, appointed by Caixa Capital, and the drag-along clause could now 
be enforced only from 2015 onwards. Exhibit 15 describes the main terms in place after Caixa 
Capital’s investment and Exhibit 16 shows the evolution of Nonius shareholder structure. 
7. Decision taking 
 In 2015, António Silva came across one of the major challenges he ever faced as Nonius’ 
CEO. More than half of the equity was detained by VC funds and two of them were expected 
to reach the end of its lifetime very soon, with investors putting pressure on fund managers to 
accomplish profitable exits from current investments sooner rather than later. Furthermore, the 
drag-along clause resulting from Series B implied that, in case any shareholder wanted to sell 
its equity share, the founders could be forced to either acquire it, which would involve a major 
financial investment, or sell theirs along, being forced to abandon their company. For both 
reasons, Nonius current shareholder structure could not remain unchanged for much longer.  
 In addition, the management team wanted to continue the international expansion of the 
business. Nonius had already obtained a significant share of the Portuguese market, having to 
increase its investment on foreign markets to boost the business volume. The expansion plan 
comprised the strengthening of its position in current markets, as well as the entrance in new 
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ones. However, to fund this plan, Nonius would have inevitably to go through another financing 
round. Since Series B, the company had received no significant funding and the strategy of 
growing through acquisitions led to several investments that, although contributing to increase 
its size and seize opportunities in new markets, had exhausted the previously raised funds.  
 Considering the inevitability of changes in Nonius’ capital structure, António Silva 
pondered several options. Performing an IPO or a trade sale of Nonius to a largest international 
competitor were two hypothesis that have quickly gone through his mind. The company had 
gained some dimension in previous years and its valuation had increased significantly in each 
financing round. Furthermore, business volume had consistently grown at remarkable annual 
rates and operational results had improved from year to year, which positively influenced 
financial perspectives for the following years, increasing António’s hopes of getting a good 
valuation either in IPO or trade sale scenario. However, he did not get overenthusiastic about 
the idea of selling the company he had founded. The founders did not want to be rushed into 
the decision of leaving or losing power over the company due to other shareholders’ pressure, 
preferring to remain for a few more years. Exhibit 17 shows the evolution of the global IPO 
market for the tech industry and the sub-industry of software developers, and Exhibit 18 
presents the implied valuation multiples of acquired European companies in those industries.  
 Another alternative António considered was the replacement of the equity positions of VC 
funds by investments from new shareholders. Such operation would provide the desired 
profitable exit to current VC and replace their positions with the entrance of new investors in 
the share capital. The new shareholders could be other VC or private equity funds, which would 
provide financial support to pay the exit of the departing shareholders and fund the company 
expansion. Nevertheless, António came across some issues regarding this solution. First, 
Nonius was no longer a startup, but a mature company, which would deter most VC from 
investing on its equity, given its current developing stage, the invested amount it would require 
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and the poor perspectives of achieving a decent internal rate of return (IRR) at exit. 
Furthermore, António perceived this moment as an opportunity to recover control over Nonius 
business decisions, which the founders had lost over the years due to the continuous entry of 
new shareholders and the resulting dilution on their equity positions. 
 This final consideration led to another alternative, a Management Buyout (MBO). The two 
founders could acquire the equity position of other shareholders, recovering the majority of 
Nonius share capital and consequently taking control over the company’s business decisions. 
To financially support this operation, Nonius could raise debt from banks and other investors, 
bringing up a balanced mix between senior long-term bank loans and more junior financial 
instruments, such as Mezzanine debt. Still, this option had also its drawbacks. Bank debt would 
impose the burden of having to perform periodical installments to reimburse the loaned amount, 
plus interests. For its part, Mezzanine debt would bring financial and operational covenants that 
could turn debt into equity if certain criteria were not met, diluting once again the founders’ 
equity positions, which was ironically the departure point they wanted to abandon.  
 No clear solution for Nonius was in sight. António Silva had a difficult decision to take - 
and the clock was ticking. 
Teaching note 
Synopsis: Nonius Software is a Portuguese technological group, specialized in developing 
digital solutions to the hospitality market. Founded in 2005 to seize an opportunity in the 
emerging market for public internet hotspots, the company grew in size, number of products 
and international coverage, maintaining an edge over competitors. After 3 major financing 
rounds, founders knew Nonius had to go through a capital structure reorganization, since the 
managers of 2 VC funds wanted to sell their equity positions. This move represented a serious 
challenge for the founders, for it was uncertain which option would better address VC’s desires 
and their own, among an IPO, a trade sale, a MBO or new shareholders. 
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Pedagogical objectives and intended audience: This case can be used to illustrate how 
entrepreneurs may seize market opportunities resulting from technological innovation and 
modification of consumer behaviors. It may also be used to address strategies for achieving and 
maintaining competitive advantage on startups and for expanding internationally. In addition, 
the case may be useful to describe the financing options for new ventures, according to their 
development stage, to show the terms and implications of venture capital investments and to 
evaluate the available alternatives when initial investors intend to harvest. In an 
entrepreneurship course, this case may be used to approach strategies for new ventures to seize 
technological market opportunities and get competitive advantage. In an entrepreneurial finance 
course, it could be not only a starting point to analyze alternative ways of startups raising funds 
to finance growth but also an example of the founders’ dilemma of choosing among alternatives 
to accommodate the exit of pressing VC investors while regaining control and avoiding dilution.  
Questions: 
1. Identify the founders’ decisions that drove Nonius to early success: Lussier (1995)1 
identified 15 explanatory variables that could explain success in young firms, including industry 
experience, partners, product timing, planning, professional advisors, and capital, among 
others. Exhibit TN1 provides an explanation of those success variables. In fact, several of these 
factors drove Nonius to early success. First of all, the founders conceived a solution solidly 
rooted on their technical knowledge and professional experience in telecommunication 
solutions and management software (industry experience). This product expertise, together with 
the group dynamics attained from being former team members (partners), contributed to 
accelerate prototype development and allowed an increased assertiveness in the choice of 
features for the product. On the other hand, the early identification of the market opportunity 
resulting from the emergence of wireless internet technologies was crucial to recognize the 
needs it would create and to anticipate the expansion of the market for WISP, in order to offer 
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a solution that could address those needs (product timing). Success was also grounded on 
having set as main priority the development of a minimum viable product, improving the 
platform up to a stage that could confirm its potential and searching for validation on AdI’s 
contest, all this before founding Nonius (planning). Last but not least, the academic skills in 
Business Management obtained by António Silva allowed an adequate construction of the 
business plan, while the decision of choosing Beta Capital as investor brought valuable advice 
and business contacts that guaranteed a quick entry in the market (professional advisors). All 
these factors led Nonius to generate revenues fast and at a growing pace. These precocious 
revenues combined with the subsidies for innovation and R&D and the product development 
partnerships that were established in early years, for example with Crivo (capital), contributed 
to shorten Nonius’ Valley of Death (VoD) - the concept of VoD has been described by Markham 
et al. (2010)2 as the transitional period when a new product is being taken to the market, where 
the large resource consumption with R&D cannot yet be supported by revenues generated from 
sales (Exhibit TN2 shows the VoD). Although being typically shorter for tech ventures, the 
entrepreneurs’ decisions shortened it even more, by setting the conditions to obtain early cash 
inflows that soon exceeded outflows. 
2. Explain the factors conferring competitive advantage to Nonius’ products along the years: 
Porter (1985)3 states that organizations can achieve competitive advantage through cost 
advantage and differentiation advantage. In Nonius case, a number of differentiation strategies 
were adopted over the years to gain and maintain advantage. To begin, it was one of the first 
companies to address the WISP business segment in Portugal, benefiting from first mover 
advantage in a market with large growth potential. Nonius focused on delivering solutions that 
guaranteed high-quality internet connections, while its platforms encompassed a larger set of 
features than the competitors’ ones, enabling clients to customize and manage their internet 
offer to final users. Yet, the main differentiation factors were the highly customizable features 
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of its products, able to match diverse business specifications and client preferences, as well as 
the development partnerships established with clients, which allowed quick adjustments by 
understanding their specific needs. As the product portfolio grew, strategies to maintain 
competitive advantage became more diverse. Nonius focused exclusively on its most successful 
market, the hospitality industry, adapting the most recent technologies to its specific needs, 
illustrated by the use of IP technologies in NiVo or the introduction of Smart TVs. This 
refocusing, together with a permanent attention to the evolution of guests’ technological 
demands, allowed Nonius to consistently launch last generation solutions that targeted 
challenges faced by the hospitality industry with greater assertiveness than competition. In 
addition, Nonius could offer a set of integrated solutions of TV, internet, telephony, signage 
and apps, specifically targeted to the hospitality industry and covering the majority of the 
sector’s technological needs. This proved to be a major advantage over main competitors, which 
either offered solutions to just one product segment or developed broad solutions without any 
sector-specialization. Hotel managers preferred to have one technological provider that could 
offer several products and keep them up-to-date than having to deal with multiple suppliers and 
be constantly aware of the last technological trends in the sector. 
3. Analyze Nonius’ strategies to achieve international growth: Anderson and Gatignon (1986)4 
evaluated the impact of market entry modes on the entrant’s level of control over its foreign 
business operations, establishing high, medium and low-control modes. Exhibit TN3 presents 
this categorization. Apart from the level of control, these modes also differed significantly 
regarding cost, commitment, risk and return. In its first years of internationalization, Nonius 
favored indirect exportation, through integrators operating in foreign target markets, and 
licensing of products, when needed to overcome market entry barriers (as in Germany). This 
strategy allowed Nonius to focus on product development, trusting in the market recognition 
that those integrators and licensees already had. However, although implying lower risk of 
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failure and less investment (funded mainly through the Series A round), these low-control 
modes restricted Nonius’ main source of differentiation, which was the close relationship with 
customers, thus reducing the potential return from internationalization. Hence, Nonius started 
adopting higher control entry modes. In 2011, it established a joint-venture in Brazil, taking 
advantage from the market positioning of its Brazilian partner and sharing associated costs and 
risks. However, being a 50/50 equity joint venture, limited operational control was an inevitable 
drawback. In the following years, Nonius performed a number of acquisitions in the Brazilian, 
African and European markets, which guaranteed quick entries in those crucial target markets. 
This high-control strategy, although comprising higher risk and larger investments (funded 
through the Series B round), leveraged on the existing product and client portfolio of the 
acquired companies and allowed a closer attention to clients’ demands, increasing Nonius 
dimension and revenues. 
4. Evaluate the financing options that Nonius’ founders should have considered for its start-
up financing round. Analyze the pros and cons of those alternatives: Vinturella and Erickson 
(2013)5 identify several financing options for new ventures, including bootstrapping, 
government subsidies, business angel (BA) financing, VC and debt. From these alternatives, 
Osnabrugge (2000)6 compares BA and VC investments, regarding type and amount of funding 
provided, shared experience, complexity of due diligence and investment terms, monitoring and 
influence demanded and focus on exit routes, among others. At its start-up financing round, 
founders focused on obtaining funding to finalize the WGServer, target initial clients and 
achieve its first sales. Considering its infant development stage and the risks inherent to a 
project not yet exposed to market challenges and competition, Nonius might continue 
bootstrapping from their finances, which would allow full control over business decisions and 
total focus on product development, instead of constantly reporting to an external investor. 
However, gaining dimension through bootstrapping would imply a great financial effort from 
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founders, while waiving the expertise and business know-how provided by other investors. To 
rely solely on funding provided by government R&D subsidies was not an option, since those 
funds alone would not be sufficient to finance operations for the first years, being necessary to 
complement them with other financing sources. Another choice would be a long-term bank 
debt, since the bank would not require an ownership stake and Nonius could also start benefiting 
from debt’s tax shield effects. Yet, a bank loan would impose a priority use of generated cash-
flows to perform periodic repayments, restricting its reinvestment in growth strategies. In 
addition, given the uncertainty and risks related to Nonius early development stage, the bank 
would demand tough covenants and high interest rates, together with some collateral, which 
was hard to provide for a recent technological firm with few or no fixed assets. As alternative, 
founders could obtain investment from a BA, forgoing an equity stake and full control over the 
company’s decisions in exchange for funding and relevant industry or entrepreneurial 
experience from an individual available to invest in the company’s growth. A BA with know-
how and a wide network of relations in the hotel industry or technology business would create 
opportunities to accelerate Nonius entry in the market, while demanding more favorable 
investment terms than VCs. Conversely, the BA would provide less structural support, might 
have different expectations for the business than the founders, would imply little follow-on 
money and, last but not least, could be hard to find, either because possible candidates were not 
suitable for the target-markets or were not available to invest in the company. In the end, the 
founders opted for VC funding. A VC fund brings not only business and managerial expertise 
and a vast network of connections as a BA would, but can also provide larger initial and follow-
on investment amounts. And having in mind a profitable exit strategy since the beginning of its 
investment, a VC will be a better choice to enhance Nonius’ growth potential. Nevertheless, 
founders had to forgo a larger equity stake and accept a major dilution in subsequent financing 
rounds, while losing decision power over relevant financial and operational issues. Moreover, 
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VC investments typically require long due diligence and tough and complex investment terms, 
as attested by Beta Capital’s clauses providing downside protection and upside benefits. Finally, 
VC funds place high exit pressure from a certain point, to guarantee its investors a profitable 
exit and maximize its IRR, as ended up being the case in 2015. Exhibit TN4 shows the pros 
and cons of each financing alternative. 
5. Analyze the alternatives considered by António Silva in 2015, describing their benefits and 
disadvantages for the founders: Vinturella and Erickson (2013)7 identify 3 main exit routes for 
investors to harvest investments: IPOs, M&A and MBOs. In turn, Giot and Schwienbacher 
(2007)8 mention that the option between IPO, trade sale or other exit strategy must vary 
according to company and investment-related variables, such as operating industry, company 
development stage, invested amounts, number of financing rounds and time elapsed since initial 
investment, among others. When António Silva considered an IPO of Nonius, he was aware 
that the operation would allow VCs to accomplish an exit at a considerable profit, given the 
total amounts they had invested, and, if successful, it could increase the company’s visibility in 
the market, boosting business volume and providing liquidity to pursue the international 
expansion plan. Nonius had a good track record for growth and still held future potential, 
exploring consistently new technologies and foreign markets that enabled successful launches 
over the years, which would positively impact its valuation. Yet, the IPO process was a long 
and costly one, delaying the departure of pressing VCs, bringing unnecessary and almost 
unbearable costs and diverting management focus from product development and operational 
issues. And although Nonius financial performance had improved significantly in recent years 
and the technological sector was a “hot” one, the company had still not reached the size to be a 
relevant IPO target, to be realistic. Between the 4Q 2014 and 3Q 2015, technology companies 
performing IPO’s received, on average, a valuation with a multiple of 4.2x sales, while software 
companies were valued on 5.5x sales, implying a valuation for Nonius of just between €20m 
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and €27m, considering its sales of €4.8m. Markets would take it as a small offering on a very 
small company, attracting little analyst attention and receiving no coverage, thus increasing the 
probability of becoming a stock with low liquidity. This context, along with the lack of tradition 
for IPOs in the Portuguese market and the potential reputational hazard brought by a failed IPO, 
let alone the founders’ intention to recover control of the company, made the option of 
performing an IPO not desirable. For its part, a trade sale was still a hypothesis to be considered, 
since Nonius had already a significant dimension and international presence, being known to 
competitors and other potential buyers. Due to strategic buyers’ market knowledge, an auction 
would certainly push Nonius price up, with the acquirer having an incentive to pay a price as 
higher as the potential synergies extracted from the deal. Between the 4Q 2014 and 3Q 2015, 
tech companies acquired in trade sales on European developed markets received, on average, a 
valuation with a multiple of 3.0x sales, while software companies where valued on 2.3x sales, 
implying a valuation for Nonius in case of trade sale between €11m and €15m. The process 
would be simpler, quicker and cheaper than an IPO. However, Nonius would get a lower 
valuation, typical of trade sale deals, due to the smaller size of companies involved compared 
to IPOs and the inclination of markets to deliver higher valuations than strategic investors, 
mostly due to the asymmetry of information regarding the industry and the potential of the 
company. Worse, such option would not bring the control of the company back to its founders: 
in fact, it could even force them to leave their management positions and, most probably, the 
company. Another option would be to accommodate the entrance of new shareholders to replace 
VCs, which would provide them the desired exit and also fund the international expansion of 
Nonius through further investments by the incoming shareholders. Still, investors available to 
become shareholders of the company on such conditions would probably be other VCs or 
private equity growth funds and that could raise though problems. The fact that Nonius had 
already lost the startup status and had matured into a company with solid performance could 
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deter the investment from most VCs, usually searching for companies requiring low initial 
investment but holding significant growth perspectives, to achieve a profitable exit and high 
IRR. This problem would be overcome if the investor was a growth fund, which typically 
invests in later stages, on companies with consistent revenues but room to grow. These funds 
adopt a hybrid strategy of own capital and debt, leveraging their returns and asking for lower 
equity stakes, therefore reducing the founders’ dilution and even allowing them to partially 
cash-in. Nevertheless, those funds would demand significant control over relevant business 
decisions, something that would go against the founders’ intentions; and later on, they would 
also start putting pressure to perform a profitable exit. So, the remaining option would be the 
MBO. The founders could buyout the equity positions of other shareholders with the amounts 
raised through bank and mezzanine debt, regaining the decision-making power over Nonius 
business and being held accountable before no one regarding their management decisions. 
Nevertheless, the debt raised to finance both the MBO process and international expansion 
would bring some burden to the company. Bank debt would demand collaterals and impose 
periodical repayments of capital and interests, while the mezzanine investor would bring 
financial and operational covenants that may turn debt into equity if the premises were not met, 
diluting the founders stake and claiming decision powers. 
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Exhibit 1 – Background of the entrepreneurs 
António Silva finished his Bachelors degree in Electronics by Instituto de Engenharia do 
Porto in 1998, being immediately employed by Efacec, a Portuguese multinational company 
operating in the sectors of electronics, engineering and energy, among others. At Efacec, 
Antonio worked as a software engineer, developing IP networking firmware and integration 
solutions, having met Leonel Domingues and Rui Castro, co-workers and team members 
in several common projects. António remained in the company for two years, taking at the 
same time a post-graduation in Telecommunications and Networking Systems by Faculdade 
de Engenharia do Porto. In 2000, António accepted an offer from Windriver Systems, an 
American company specialized in the development of industry-specific software solutions, 
and moved to the UK, to develop network solutions for major clients in Europe. He kept the 
position for two years, having moved in 2002 to LSI Logic, another American company with 
offices in the UK and dedicated to design and conceive networking software. At LSI, António 
was responsible for the designing and development of software for a specific solution of the 
company, position that he occupied until becoming Nonius CEO. His academic background 
and professional experiences have been fundamental to develop the necessary technical skill 
and market knowledge to make Nonius thrive.  
Leonel Domingues graduated in Industrial Electronics in 1994 by Universidade do Minho 
and completed a Master degree in Electronics in 1996, in the same University, where he was 
also Teaching Assistant and Research Assistant. In 1994, Leonel started his professional 
career as software and hardware developer, function that he performed for the following 14 
years in different companies, such as Efacec. In 2015, at the moment of Nonius foundation, 
Leonel had already been software architect and R&D team leader at Lucent Technologies for 
five years, position that conferred him product development know-how and team 
management skills to become CTO at Nonius.  
Rui Castro graduated in Electrical and Computers Engineering by Universidade do Porto in 
1996 and completed a Masters in Telecommunications by Chalmers University of 
Technology in 1998. In 1997, Rui started his career as R&D engineer for Ericsson, which 
was followed by positions as software engineer and telecommunications researcher in 
companies such as Efacec and Novabase. In 2005, he became Nonius COO, a role in which 
his professional experience has been fundamental to confer him skills to administrate the 




Exhibit 2 – The WirelessGestServer (example of WGHotel, specific for Hotels)  
The WGHotel creates a network for public Internet access in the hotel, separating it from the 
hotel’s internal network. The solution is prepared to integrate the Internet billing with the 
hotel’s billing system, by interfacing with the hotel’s front-office system. When a room is 
checked-in, the information is sent to the WGSHotel that automatically generates a username 
and a password for that room. The login data can then be sent to a ticket printer, located at 
the hotel’s reception and this ticket may be attached to the room’s key card. The WGHotel 
also sets the charging tariff by usage time or volume, allowing to differentiate prices 
according to guest categories, and monitors the bandwidth usage, allowing to set a maximum 
bandwidth available per user. 
WGHotel may also provide 100% security to the hotel’s clients when they connect to the 
public network. With the WG3PSW (WirelessGEST 3rd-Party Switch) module the room’s 
Ethernet plug may be enabled at check-in and disabled at check-out, prohibiting its usage 
when the room is not checked-in. WG3PSW may also configure one VLAN per room, 
preventing communication between different rooms in the same LAN.  
 
 
Figure 1: WGServer network 





Exhibit 3 – The WGStargate 
Launched in 2008, the WGS was a system designed to provide internet connection to river 
and sea cruise ships and tourist boats. While sailing, ships often had access to no other 
internet signal than the one provided by satellites, receiving signal from other data 
communication technologies only sporadically, mostly when approaching the shore or 
riverbanks. These satellite connections were extremely costly, being important to optimize 
the way they were used. The WGS brought a solution to the problem, enabling the automatic 
selection of the least expensive technology available in a given moment, without reducing 
the intensity or quality of the signal. It allowed cruise ship operators to provide high speed 
internet connection to passengers while moving or passing through remote locations, and, at 
the same time, guarantee the necessary bandwidth for internal and business communications 
through a dedicated mechanism developed by Nonius. Hence, the WGS provided cost 
reduction with communications and maximization of benefits and services. 
To develop the project, Nonius applied to a startup-directed initiative created by the European 
Space Agency (ESA). The project has been one of a total of 7 projects approved in a contest, 
being therefore technically and financially supported by ESA. Nonius counted also on Douro 
Azul, a Portuguese company dedicated to touristic trips on the Douro River, as product 
development partner, keeping the policy of partnering up with potential clients.  
Besides the niche market of cruise ships providing tourist trips in rivers and seas, the platform 
targeted also the areas of defense and civil protection, since it allowed the quick placement 
and operation of an emergency communication services in the event of a disaster or calamity. 
 
Figure 2: WGStargate network 




Exhibit 4 – The WGPositionSystem 
Launched in 2009, the WG-WPS was a solution designed to locate people and objects using 
a laptop or smartphone and a location tag connected to a wireless network. Location tags 
could be transported by people or attached to objects, sending notifications in certain 
situations, such as the loss of signal or the entrance of people in non-authorized places. The 
platform was primarily designed to be used in hospitals, to locate doctors, patients or medical 
equipment, but it ended up being also introduced in the hospitality business, mainly with the 
function of locating children within a hotel or resort and track them down through the 
television in the room or a smartphone.  
The WG-WPS was developed in partnership with several entities, which supported the 
project both financially and technically. Concerning technical support, Nonius partnered up 
with Hospital Joaquim Urbano, in Porto, where implementation trials have been conducted, 
and with ISEP, an engineering university, which provided technical aid. Regarding financial 
support, Nonius entered into a financing agreement with Crivo Ventures, to cover 
development expenses and reduce the development risk. 
 
 
Figure 3: WGPositionSystem network 




Exhibit 5 – NiVo 
“In the past, the hospitality industry was able to offer in-room services and contents that did 
not exist at the guest’s home. Nowadays, the industry is falling behind in that chapter. Hotels 
are not being able to offer more up-to-date and technologically evolved solutions than the 
ones that the guest can obtain at home… NiVO represents Nonius’ solution to this challenge, 
for a highly competitive price when compared to the investment required for having an 





Figure 4: NiVo’s main features 




Exhibit 6 – Nonius product portfolio 
 




Table 1: Tech2H profit & loss statement  
Source: Annual financial reports 
 
Table 2: Impresa DGSM profit & loss statement  
Source: Annual financial reports 
Note: In 2014, DGSM was totally integrated in Nonius Software 
 
 
Exhibit 7 – Tech2H post-acquisition performance 
    
Currency: € 000 2012 2013 2014 
Sales and services rendered 87  241  941  
Other operating income 0  0   -   
Operating costs (95) (150) (399) 
EBITDA (7) 92  542  
Depreciation and amortization  -   (6) (132) 
EBIT (7) 86  410  
Financial result  -   (2) (94) 
EBT (7) 84  316  
Income tax  -   (22) (104) 
Net profit (7) 62  212  
Sales growth rate (%)  -   177% 290% 
EBITDA growth rate (%)  -   1161% 491% 
EBITDA margin (%) -8% 38% 58% 
 
 
Exhibit 8 – Impresa DGSM’s acquisition and performance 
In May 2012, Nonius acquired Impresa DGSM. The transaction has been evaluated in €1.5m 
but no cash has been involved. Instead, Nonius acquired 100% of Impresa DGSM and its 
sole owner, Impresa S.A., the largest private media group in Portugal, became shareholder 
of Nonius, receiving company shares representing 15% of its share capital. 
 “We believe that this operation brings several benefits for our partners, namely by offering 
more and better products, solutions and contents for the hospitality and hospital markets; by 
bringing a better geographical coverage with the delegations in Porto (headquarters), Lisbon 
and São Paulo; by improving efficiency and responsiveness to every client; and by conveying 
a stronger shareholder structure, able of supporting current and future projects at a national 
and international level” said Antonio Silva about the acquisition of Impresa DGSM. 
Currency: € 000 2012 2013 
Sales and services rendered 716  283  
Other operating income 13  4  
Operating costs (497) (152) 
EBITDA 233  136  
Depreciation and amortization (218) (128) 
EBIT 15  8  
Financial costs (5)  -   





Table 3: TendiQ profit & loss statement  
Source: Annual financial reports 
 
Exhibit 9 – TendiQ’s acquisition and performance 
In May 2014, Nonius acquired TendiQ, an investment amounting to a global sum of €260k. 
Nonius paid €80k to TendiQ’s shareholders and distributed 36,000 shares of capital among 
the shareholders and management employees, representing 1.2% of its equity.  
Currency: € 000 May - Dec 2014 
Sales and services rendered 526  828  
Operating costs (526) (802) 
EBITDA (0) 26  
Depreciation and amortization (2) (7) 
EBIT (2) 19  
Financial result  -   (2) 
EBT (2) 17  
Income tax  -   (4) 








Figure 5: Geographies where Nonius operated in 2014 
Source: Annual financial report 2014 
Graph 1: Evolution in the number of clients  
Source: Annual financial reports 
 
Exhibit 10 – Number of clients, relevant customers and international presence 
 
 



















































Portuguese market International markets
Table 4: Evolution of Nonius revenues 
Source: Annual financial reports 
*Revenues for 2012, 2013 and 2014 were generated by the entire group, comprised by Nonius Software, Nonius Europe and Nonius Brasil. 
 
Graph 2: Evolution and segmentation of Nonius revenues 
Source: Annual financial reports 
Series A round; 
Internationalization 
process 
Series B round; 
Acquisitions strategy Startup 
financing round 
 Exhibit 11 – Nonius financial and operational performance 
Revenues 
Currency: € 000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013* 2014* 
Portuguese market 52  185  373  565  768  993  825  1,621  2,616  2,301  
International markets  -    -    -   76  93  229  277  298  675  2,527  
Sales and services 52  185  373  641  861  1,222  1,103  1,919  3,291  4,827  
Sales annual growth rate  -   259% 102% 72% 34% 42% -10% 74% 72% 47% 
International sales (in % of total)  -    -    -   12% 11% 19% 25% 16% 21% 52% 
Portuguese market annual growth rate  -   259% 102% 51% 36% 29% -17% 96% 61% -12% 




   
 










Graph 3: Evolution of Nonius revenue and EBITDA 
Source: Annual financial reports 



































Revenue from sales and services EBITDA
Table 5: Nonius team members by department 
Source: Annual financial reports 
Table 6: Evolution of Nonius team  





















Departments 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Executive team 2  2  2  3  
Finance & Administrative 2  3  5  6  
Sales & Marketing 6  8  8  10  
R&D 17  14  13  15  
Operations 6  8  16  25  
Total 33  35  44  59  
Year # members Growth (%) 
2006 8   -   
2007 17  113% 
2008 21  24% 
2009 26  24% 
2010 35  35% 
2011 33  -6% 
2012 35  6% 
2013 44  26% 
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Graph 4: Revenue by geography 
Source: Annual financial report 2014 
Graph 5: Revenue by market 
Source: Annual financial report 2014 
Graph 6: Revenue by product 
Source: Annual financial report 2014 






















Exhibit 12 – Main clauses from startup financing round 
▪ Veto power: Any decision on the following topics can only be taken with the previous 
agreement of Beta Capital: management remuneration, profit distribution, capital 
injections, issue of preferred or ordinary shares, election of social bodies, among others. 
 
▪ Redemption: Beta Capital has the right to sell its shares and the founders have the 
obligation of acquiring them, in case the venture capitalist veto power is not respected on 
the previous topics or any founder decides to sell his shares, among other situations. The 
price to pay by the founders corresponds to 4x the investment performed by Beta Capital 
at Nonius.  
 
▪ Pre-emption: In case any shareholder wishes to sell his shares of Nonius’ capital, the 
remaining shareholders may choose to acquire those shares, under the terms defined by 
the seller, having priority over any party which do not own company shares. 
 
▪ Tag-along: In case any founder decides to sell his shares to a third party, Beta Capital may 
require that the buyer also purchases its shares, in the same proportion and under the same 
terms defined to the acquisition of the founder’s shares.  
 
▪ Drag-along: From 2013 onwards, if Beta Capital finds a buyer for its shares and intends 
to accept an acquisition proposal for them, the founders are compelled to sell their shares, 
jointly and pro rata, to the proposed buyer, under the same terms defined to the acquisition 
of Beta Capital’s shares. In alternative, the founders may opt for acquiring Beta Capital 







Table 7: Nonius sales’ revenues and subsidies 
Source: Annual financial reports 
*: Revenues for 2012, 2013 and 2014 were generated by the entire group, comprised by Nonius Software, Nonius Europe and Nonius Brasil 
 
Graph 7: Nonius sales’ revenues and subsidies 
Source: Annual financial reports 
*: Revenues for 2012, 2013 and 2014 were generated by the entire group, comprised by Nonius Software, Nonius Europe and Nonius Brasil 
 
 Exhibit 13 – Subsidies 
Currency: € 000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013* 2014* 
Sales and services rendered 52  185  373  641  861  1,222  1,103  1,919  3,291  4,827  
Subsidies 6  81  28  57  149  385  59  481  197  85  
Subsidies annual growth rate  -   1247% -65% 104% 160% 158% -85% 715% -59% -57% 
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Exhibit 14 – Main clauses from Series A financing round 
▪ Qualified majority: Any decision on the following topics can only be taken with the 
agreement of the holders of at least 2/3 of Nonius share capital: management 
remuneration, profit distribution, capital injections, issue of preferred or ordinary shares, 
election of social bodies, among others. 
 
▪ Redemption: Beta Capital and FSCR have the right to sell their shares and the founders 
have the obligation of acquiring them, in case the previous voting rule is not respected 
on the said topics or the founders disrespect any clause established by Series A 
investments. The price to pay by the founders corresponds to 4x the investment 
performed by Beta Capital or FSCR at Nonius. 
 
▪ Pre-emption: In case any shareholder wishes to sell his shares of Nonius’ capital, the 
remaining shareholders may choose to acquire those shares, under the terms defined by 
the seller and having priority over any party which do not own company shares. 
 
▪ Tag-along: In case any shareholder decides to sell his shares to a third party, any 
remaining shareholder may require that the buyer also purchases his shares, in the same 
proportion and under the same terms defined to the acquisition of the selling 
shareholder’s shares.  
 
▪ Drag-along: From 2013 onwards, if either Beta Capital or FSCR find a buyer for their 
respective shares and intend to accept an acquisition proposal for them, the founders are 
compelled to sell their shares, jointly and pro rata, to the proposed buyer, under the same 
terms defined to the acquisition of the seller’s shares. In alternative, the founders may 
opt for acquiring those shares, as long as they offer the same conditions than the 
proposed buyer.  
 
▪ Stock warrants:  The management team and other key employees are entitled to acquire 
a total of 22,500 shares of Nonius, at the par value of €10. Each individual is limited to 
a maximum number of shares, according to his function and previous performance. Until 
June 2011, 50% of the maximum number of shares per individual must have been 






Exhibit 15 – Main clauses from Series B financing round 
▪ Investment staging: Caixa Capital invested an overall amount of €1m at Nonius. This 
investment comprised €120k in share capital and €880k in shareholder loans. From these 
loans €380k were delivered at the date of the contract and €500k were dependent on 
milestones, such as the sale of NiVo platforms to 25 clients, its installation in 3,000 
rooms or the signing of at least one distribution agreement at Brazil and Spain.  
 
▪ Shareholder loans conversion: The shareholder loans may be fully converted into share 
capital, if the following “trigger events” take place: i) new financing round, comprising 
the entry of a new shareholder and making available at least 15% of Nonius share capital; 
ii) trade sale or IPO in which the transaction price implies a pre-money valuation greater 
than the par value of Nonius shares. In case a trigger event takes place and Caixa Capital 
opts for not converting the loans, they become remunerated at Euribor 6m plus 7,5% 
spread and should be repaid in 3 years. 
 
▪ Board: The executive board was enlarged to 4 members, comprising 2 founders and 2 
members appointed by Beta Capital and Caixa capital, one by each.  
 
▪ Qualified majority: Any decision on the following topics can only be taken with the 
agreement of the holders of at least 2/3 of Nonius share capital: management 
remuneration, profit distribution, capital injections, issue of preferred or ordinary shares, 
election of social bodies, among others. 
 
▪ Redemption: Beta Capital, FSCR and Caixa Capital have the right to sell their shares 
and the founders the obligation of acquiring them, in case the previous voting rule is not 
respected on the those topics or the founders disrespect any clause established by Series 
B investments. The price to pay by the founders corresponds to 4x the investment 
performed by Beta Capital, FSCR or Caixa Capital at Nonius. 
 
▪ Pre-emption: In case any shareholder wishes to sell his shares of Nonius’ capital, the 
remaining shareholders may choose to acquire those shares, under the terms defined by 
the seller and having priority over any party which do not own company shares. 
 
▪ Tag-along: In case any shareholder decides to sell his shares to a third party, any 
remaining shareholder may require that the buyer also purchases his shares, in the same 
proportion and under the same terms defined to the acquisition of the selling 
shareholder’s shares.  
 
▪ Drag-along: From 2015 onwards, any shareholder may present an offer to sell all his 
shares to other shareholders of Nonius. If none of them shows interest in the acquisition 
of those shares, the selling shareholder is entitled to attribute to an investment bank or 
M&A adviser an irrevocable mandate to sell the entire share capital of the company, in 





market conditions. In alternative, the selling shareholder may also find a third-party 
acquirer which accepts to buy the entire share capital of Nonius at the same or higher 
price than the one proposed initially to other shareholders.  
 
▪ Anti-dilution: In any new issue of share capital, the current shareholders benefit from 
pre-emption rights, being entitled to participate in the same proportion of the investment 
performed at Nonius, both in share capital and shareholder loans.  
 
▪ Liquidation: If Nonius equity value presents an annual reduction of more than half in a 
given year, the company may be liquidated. In the event of liquidation, Caixa Capital 
benefits from priority to get repaid, of both share capital and shareholder loans.  
 
▪ Lock-up period: During the following 3 years, Nonius founders are not allowed to sell 








Table 8: Evolution of Nonius shareholder structure 
Source: Nonius' annual management report from 2014 
Note: In March 2011, the founder Rui Castro left the company, with Nonius acquiring his shares. In June, part of the shares were distributed among 
the other two founders and some strategic employees, remaining 60,000 shares owned by Nonius. 
 
Exhibit 16 – Nonius shareholder structure  
 
  2005 - 2006 2007 - 2009 2010 2011 2012 -2013 2014 
Shares: 000 # % # % # % # % # % # % 
António Silva (Founder) 14  22.2% 26  17.1% 102  16.8% 116  16.2% 116  15.0% 439  14.6% 
Leonel Domingues (Founder) 14  22.2% 26  17.1% 102  16.8% 116  16.2% 116  15.0% 439  14.6% 
Rui Castro (Founder) 14  22.2% 24  16.3% 98  16.8%  -    -    -    -    -    -   
Beta Capital 20  33.3% 54  35.9% 215  35.9% 215  29.9% 215  27.7% 812  27.1% 
PME Investimentos - FSCR-IAPMEI  -    -   21  13.7% 82  13.7% 82  11.4% 82  10.6% 309  10.3% 
Nonius  -    -    -    -    -    -   60  8.3%  -    -   36  1.2% 
Caixa Capital - EmpreenderMais  -    -    -    -    -    -   120  16.7% 120  15.4% 452  15.1% 
Employees  -    -    -    -    -    -   10  1.4% 10  1.3% 39  1.3% 
Impresa  -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -   117  15.0% 440  14.7% 
TendiQ's shareholders and management  -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -   36  1.2% 










Graph 8: Worldwide and European number of IPOs and respective proceeds between 2010 and 2015 
Source: PWC’s report - Global Technology IPO Review 




Table 9: Enterprise value multiples on global IPOs of technology companies 
Source: PWC’s report - Global Technology IPO Review 













Enterprise value (EV) multiples for technology companies on IPOs  
  4Q 2014 1Q 2015 2Q 2015 3Q 2015 LTM 
EV / LTM Revenue 3.7x 3.7x 5.5x 3.0x 4.2x 
EV / LTM EBITDA 43.1x 26.2x 48.8x 20.6x 39.0x 
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Table 10: Enterprise value multiples on global IPOs of software companies (being software a sub-industry of the technology industry) 
Source: PWC’s report - Global Technology IPO Review 




Table 11: Enterprise value multiples on trade sales of technology companies from European developed markets (Available data) 
Source: Capital IQ data 




Table 12: Enterprise value multiples on trade sales of software companies from European developed markets (being software a sub-industry of the 
technology industry) (Available data) 
Source: Capital IQ data 




Enterprise value (EV) multiples for software companies on IPOs 
  4Q 2014 1Q 2015 2Q 2015 3Q 2015 LTM 
EV / LTM Revenue 3.4x 10.6x 8.2x 5.5x 5.5x 
EV / LTM EBITDA 35.8x 54.4x 30.2x -21.3x 26.8x 








Exhibit 18 – Implied valuation of technology and software companies in the M&A market 
 
Enterprise value (EV) multiples for technology companies on trade sales in Europe 
  4Q 2014 1Q 2015 2Q 2015 3Q 2015 LTM 
Implied EV / Revenue 2.6x 3.24x 4.72x 1.8x 3.0x 
Implied EV / EBITDA 33.7x 14.77x 12.52x 18.19x 19.9x 






Enterprise value (EV) multiples for software companies on trade sales in Europe 
  4Q 2014 1Q 2015 2Q 2015 3Q 2015 LTM 
Implied EV / Revenue 2.3x 2.6x 1.8x 2.2x 2.3x 
Implied EV / EBITDA 23.2x 19.5x 5.89x 17.5x 18.5x 









Appendixes to Teaching Note 
Exhibit TN1 – Explanation of success variables 
1. Capital: Businesses that start undercapitalized have a greater chance of failure than firms that 
start with adequate capital.  
2. Record keeping and financial control: Businesses that do not keep updated and accurate 
records and do not use adequate financial controls have a greater chance of failure than firms 
that do. 
3. Industry experience: Businesses managed by people without prior industry experience have a 
greater chance of failure than firms managed by people with prior industry experience. 
4. Management Experience: Businesses managed by people without prior management 
experience have a greater chance of failure than firms that are managed by people with prior 
management experience. 
5. Planning: Businesses that do not develop specific business plans have a greater chance of 
failure than firms that do. 
6. Professional Advisors: Businesses that do not use professional advisors have a greater chance 
of failure than firms using professional advisors. 
7. Education: People without any college education who start a business have a greater chance 
of failure than people with one or more years of college education. 
8. Staffing: Businesses that cannot attract and retain quality employees have a greater chance of 
failure than firms that can. 
9. Product/Service Timing: Businesses that select products/services that are too new or too old 
have a greater chance of failure than firms that select products/services that are in the growth 
stage. 
10. Economic Timing: Businesses that start during a recession have a greater chance of failure 
than firms that start during expansion periods. 
11. Age: Younger people who start a business have a greater chance of failure than older people 
starting a business. 
12. Partners: A business started by one person has a greater chance of failure than a firm started 
by more than one person. 
13. Parents: Business owners whose parents did not own a business have a greater chance of failure 
than owners whose parents did own a business. 
14. Minority: Minorities have a greater chance of failure than non-minorities. 
15. Marketing: Business owners without marketing skills have a greater chance of failure than 
owners with marketing skills. 
 
Source: Lussier, Robert. 1995. “A nonfinancial business success versus failure prediction model 





Exhibit TN2 – Valley of death 
 
Figure 6: Valley of Death description 
Source: Markham, Stephen, Ward, Stephen, and Kingon, Angus. 2010. “The Valley of Death as 








Exhibit TN3 – Market entry modes according to entrant´s control level  
 
Figure 7: Categorization of entry modes regarding control level 
Source: Anderson, Erin, and Gatignon, Hubert. 1986. “Modes of Foreign Entry: A Transaction 






Source: Casewritter  
Exhibit TN4 – Pros and cons of financing alternatives 
Bootstrapping  
Advantages Disadvantages 
▪ Full control over business decisions 
▪ No pressure from external investors 
▪ No ownership dilution 
▪ Unnecessary financial risk borne by the 
founders 
▪ May not be enough to fund growth 
▪ Loss of advice from professional 
investors 
 
Government R&D subsidies 
 
Advantages Disadvantages 
▪ No repayment  
▪ Provides funding for innovation and risky 
research projects 
▪ Insufficient to fund company growth 
▪ Provides no technical assistance 
▪ Funding is staged and subject to 





▪ No ownership stake required 
▪ Tax shield effect of debt 
▪ Periodic repayments 
▪ Tough covenants 
▪ High interest rates for growing 
companies 





▪ Favorable and informal investment terms 
▪ Industry and entrepreneurial advice 
▪ Wide network of business industry 
relations 
▪ Little follow-on money 
▪ Demands equity stake at the company 
▪ Less structural support 
▪ Seeks decision power on business 
strategy matters 
▪ Hard to find a suitable one 
 
Venture capital investors  
Advantages Disadvantages 
▪ Business and managerial advice 
▪ Wide network of business connections 
▪ Larger investment amounts 
▪ Enhance ventures’ growth potential 
▪ Demands decision power over major 
financial and operational issues 
▪ Demands large equity stakes 
▪ Tough and complex investment terms 
▪ Long due diligence 
▪ High pressure to obtain profitable exit 
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